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November 17, 2015 
 
 
The Honorable Charles E. Grassley 
Chairman 
Judiciary Committee 
United States Senate 
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
 
The Honorable Robert W. Goodlatte 
Chairman 
Judiciary Committee 
United States House of Representatives 
2138 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20515 
 
The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy 
Ranking Member 
Judiciary Committee 
United States Senate 
224 Dirksen Senate Office Building 
Washington, D.C. 20510 
 
 
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. 
Ranking Member 
Judiciary Committee 
United States House of Representatives 
B-251 Rayburn House Office Building 
Washington D.C. 20515 
Dear Chairmen Grassley and Goodlatte, and Ranking Members Leahy and Conyers: 
  
In August 2014, thirty-one law professors signed a letter in opposition to proposed 
federal legislation to create a civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.1 We 
write to express continued concerns about the current version of this legislation, the Defend 
Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (“DTSA”), S. 1890 and H.R. 3326.2 While we agree that effective 
legal protection for U.S. businesses’ legitimate trade secrets is important to American 
innovation, we believe that the DTSA—which would represent the most significant 
expansion of federal law in intellectual property since the Lanham Act in 1946—will not 
solve the problems identified by its sponsors. Instead of addressing cyberespionage head-on, 
passage of the DTSA is likely to create new problems that could adversely impact domestic 
innovation, increase the duration and cost of trade secret litigation, and ultimately negatively 
affect economic growth. Therefore, the undersigned call on Congress to reject the 
DTSA. 
  
                                                 
1 Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (S. 226) and the “Trade Secrets 
Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233) (Aug. 26, 2014), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ 
files/blogs/FINAL%20Professors'%20Letter%20Opposing%20Trade%20Secret%20Legislation.pdf 
[hereinafter “2014 Professors’ Letter”] and attached. This letter incorporates and expands upon the concerns 
raised in the 2014 Professors’ Letter. 
2 We understand that the House and Senate versions of this legislation are now substantively identical. For 
convenience, this letter cites to the provisions of the Senate version, S. 1890, 114th Cong. (2015) as 
introduced on July 29, 2015 [hereinafter “S. 1890”]. 
Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015  




Summary of Arguments 
In recent years, numerous concerns about a federal civil cause of action for trade 
secret misappropriation have been detailed in analyses prepared by experts in the field of 
trade secret and intellectual property law.3 Fundamentally, these experts oppose the 
legislation because: (1) it will not address the cyberespionage problem that is most often used 
to justify the adoption of a federal trade secret law; (2) a federal trade secret law is not 
needed to protect U.S. trade secrets because there is already a robust set of state laws for the 
protection of such secrets; and (3) there are significant costs to creating a federal civil cause 
of action for trade secret misappropriation. In addition to these concerns, this letter details 
the following four specific reasons why the undersigned urge rejection of the 2015 Defend 
Trade Secrets Act. 
1. The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Provision May Harm Small Businesses, 
Startups and Other Innovators 
2. The DTSA Appears to Implicitly Recognize The Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine 
3. The DTSA Likely Will Increase the Length and Cost of Trade Secret 
Litigation 
4. The DTSA Will Likely Result in Less Uniformity in Trade Secret Law 
 We also urge Congress to hold hearings that focus on the costs of the legislation 
and whether the DTSA addresses the cyberespionage problem that it is allegedly designed to 
combat. Specifically, Congress should evaluate the DTSA through the lens of employees, 
small businesses, and startup companies that are most likely to be adversely affected by 
the legislation.  
                                                 
3 Contrary to the assertion that there is no opposition to the DTSA, a number of scholars and commentators 
have raised concerns about the DTSA’s scope, efficacy and impact. See Eric Goldman, Federal Trade Secret Bill 
Re-Introduced—And It’s Still Troublesome, Technology & Marketing Law Blog, 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2015/08/federal-trade-secret-bill-re-introduced-and-its-still-
troublesome-guest-blog-post.htm (Aug. 4, 2015); David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Open Letter to the 
Sponsors of the Revised Defend Trade Secrets Act, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/open-letter-sponsors-
revised-defend-trade-secrets-act (Aug. 3, 2015); John Tanski, The Defend Trade Secrets Act is Strong Medicine.  Is It 
Too Strong?, Nat’l L.J., Oct. 30, 2015, http://www.law.com///sites/articles/2015/10/30/the-defend-trade-
secrets-act-is-strong-medicine-is-it-too-strong/?slreturn=20150931104239. Additional recent scholarship 
critical of proposals to create a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation include: Zoe 
Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic Trade Secret Rights In Response to Cyber-
Misappropriation, 16 Yale J.L. & Tech. 172 (2014); David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade 
Secret Trolls, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 230 (2015); Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing 
Trade Secrecy, 101 Va. L. Rev. 317 (2015).  
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1. The DTSA’s Ex Parte Seizure Provision May Harm Small Businesses, 
Startups and Other Innovators 
Like its predecessor bills, the current version of the DTSA contains a controversial 
provision authorizing a trade secret owner to obtain, on an ex parte basis, a court order to 
seize property that contains alleged trade secret information under certain circumstances.4 
Although this provision is more limited in scope than prior proposals,5 it still contains 
significant potential to cause anti-competitive harm, particularly against U.S.-based small 
businesses, startups and other entrepreneurs. Moreover, proponents of the DTSA have 
argued that such a provision will not be frequently utilized, which raises the question: Why 
create a new remedy that is fraught with potential for abuse? 
First, the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision is impermissibly vague. It is unclear from 
the statutory text what “property” may be seized “to prevent the propagation or 
dissemination” of the alleged trade secret. For example, if the alleged trade secret is 
computer source code, could the court order the seizure of all computer servers (and other 
electronic storage media, like flash drives) under the defendants’ control that contains a copy 
of the code? Even with the requirement that the ex parte seizure order must “provide for the 
narrowest seizure of property necessary to achieve [these] purposes,”6 it may still result in 
significant harm to the alleged misappropriator’s legitimate business operations.7 
Second, the ex parte nature of the process for obtaining a seizure order means that an 
alleged misappropriator will be unable to immediately and meaningfully challenge the 
plaintiff’s assertions regarding the alleged trade secret status of the information and the 
claimed misappropriation. As one commentator recently explained, “so much business 
information can potentially qualify as a trade secret that it is easy for unscrupulous plaintiffs 
                                                 
4 S. § 1890, § 2 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)). For a more detailed critique of the 
infirmities of the ex parte seizure provision, see Eric Goldman, Ex Parte Seizures and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 
72 Wash. &. Lee L. Rev. Online (forthcoming Nov. 2015). 
5 Among other changes, the current version of the ex parte seizure provision would limit the scope of a seizure 
order to “property necessary to prevent the propagation or dissemination of the trade secret that is the 
subject of the action,” id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i)); it would add additional 
details regarding the required court hearing within seven days after the ex parte seizure is granted, id. 
(proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(F)); and it would require that the court take possession of 
the seized materials, id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(D)). Like last year’s DTSA, it also 
includes a provision allowing for an action for damages in the case of wrongful seizure. Id. (proposed for 
codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(G)). 
6 Id. (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(2)(B)(ii)). 
7 Cf. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. U.S. Secret Service, 816 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tex. 1993), aff’d on other grounds, 
36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994) (seizure of computer server allegedly containing an item of stolen information   
caused significant collateral damage that permanently undermined the company’s business). 
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to manufacture trade secret claims and use them as strategic weapons.”8 Self-interested 
advocates seeking an ex parte seizure order are unlikely to point out potential weaknesses 
and/or complexities in their own case, such as the likelihood of reverse engineering and 
previous disclosures that may undermine the claim of secrecy. Indeed, because the defendant 
is absent from the courtroom, the court will lack knowledge of any relevant facts that would 
weigh against granting a seizure. As a result, the DTSA’s ex parte seizure provision is 
particularly pro-plaintiff.   
Critically, because opposing an ex parte seizure order “is likely to be an extremely 
expensive process for both the courts and the parties, start-up companies that are sued by 
larger companies might very well capitulate rather than incur the expense” of challenging the 
plaintiff’s claims.9 As a result, “[t]he chilling effect on innovation and job growth . . . could 
be profound.”10 Especially as the DTSA fails to meaningfully address the cyberespionage 
problem repeatedly cited by its proponents, this reason alone suggests it should be rejected.11  
2. The DTSA Appears to Implicitly Recognize The Inevitable Disclosure 
Doctrine 
The current version of the DTSA also contains new language regarding injunctive 
relief that appears to implicitly recognize the so-called inevitable disclosure doctrine. If 
accurate, this would represent a profound shift in both the law governing the enforceability 
of non-compete agreements and trade secrets, particularly in jurisdictions that do not 
currently recognize the doctrine. 
Under the inevitable disclosure doctrine, “a plaintiff may prove a claim of trade secret 
misappropriation by demonstrating that defendant’s new employment will inevitably lead 
him to rely on the plaintiff’s trade secrets.”12 “Inevitable disclosure is not a separate cause of 
action; rather, it is a means of proving misappropriation or irreparable harm for injunctive 
relief.”13 In states that recognize inevitable disclosure, the typical remedy is to enjoin the 
                                                 
8 Tanski, supra note 3. 
9 Levine & Sandeen, Open Letter to the Sponsors of the Revised Defend Trade Secrets Act, supra note 3, at 2. 
10 Levine & Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, supra note 3, at 255; see also Tanski, supra note 3 
(explaining that “[t]he DTSA’s seizure provision—which effectively allows the plaintiff to petition the court, 
in secret, to shut down the defendant’s business for up to a week—creates significant business risk”). 
Importantly, other avenues for preliminary relief would still remain open to trade secret holders, including 
temporary restraining orders (TROs), preliminary injunctions, takedown notices under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act, and ex parte seizures under the Lanham Act. 
11
 For further discussion of the DTSA’s negative impact on cybersecurity and its failure to address 
cyberespionage, see David S. Levine, School Boy’s Tricks: Reasonable Cybersecurity and the Panic of Law Creation, 72 
Wash & Lee L. Rev. Online (forthcoming 2015). 
12 PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995). 
13 Seaman, supra note 3, at 366. 
Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2015  




departing employee from commencing employment until the subject trade secret 
information is no longer a trade secret. As Professor Elizabeth Rowe has explained, “[t]he 
inevitable disclosure doctrine is controversial primarily because . . . at its core, it appears to 
go against a fundamental tenet of employment law:  the at-will doctrine.”14   
The current version of the DTSA contains language that could reasonably be 
interpreted to endorse the inevitable disclosure doctrine as a matter of federal law. The 
DTSA provides that a court may grant an injunction “to prevent any actual or threatened 
misappropriation . . . on such terms as the court deems reasonable, provided the order does not 
prevent a person from accepting an offer of employment under conditions that avoid actual or threatened 
misappropriation.”15 The italicized language implies that if there are no conditions that would 
effectively prevent a departing employee from engaging in “actual or threatened 
misappropriation” once he or she has started working for a new employer, then the district 
court may grant an injunction prohibiting the employee from accepting the new position.   
 Federal recognition of the inevitable disclosure doctrine would be troubling because 
“a rising number of empirical studies . . . suggest that lesser constraints on employee 
mobility may increase economic growth and innovation.”16 It would also contradict the long-
standing public policy of jurisdictions like California that reject the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine as a matter of state law, and that have benefitted greatly from employee mobility.17 
In such jurisdictions, trade secret holders seeking an injunction against departing employees 
would simply invoke federal law, thus effectively rendering the state law inoperative. In sum, 
the risk that putative trade secret holders—particularly incumbent firms—could prevent 
individuals from being able to feed their families through this controversial doctrine, and 
also misuse this provision against small businesses and startups, counsel rejection of the 
DTSA. 
3. The DTSA Likely Will Increase the Length and Cost of Trade Secret 
Litigation 
In addition, the DTSA likely will increase the length and cost of trade secret litigation, 
thus further exacerbating the DTSA’s negative impact on small businesses and startups. 
Specifically, the DTSA would grant federal courts original (but not exclusive) jurisdiction 
                                                 
14 Elizabeth A. Rowe, When Trade Secrets Become Shackles: Fairness and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 7 Tul. J. 
Tech. & Intell. Prop. 167, 183 (2005). 
15 S. 1890, § 2 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)) (emphasis added). 
16 On Amir & Orly Lobel, Driving Performance:  A Growth Theory of Noncompete Law, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 833, 
837-38 (2013). 
17 See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 291-94 (Ct. App. 2002) (rejecting inevitable 
disclosure under California law).  
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over civil trade secret claims.18 To establish federal jurisdiction, a trade secret plaintiff suing 
under the DTSA would have to show that the alleged trade secret is “related to a product or 
service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.”19 Although this 
provision is apparently broad in scope, “it obviously does not (and cannot) describe all U.S. 
trade secret information, as not all trade secrets are necessarily ‘related to a product or 
service . . . used in . . . commerce,’ like many customers lists.”20 At a minimum, the trade 
secret plaintiff would have to demonstrate to the court’s satisfaction, likely early in the case, 
that the alleged trade secrets satisfy this jurisdictional requirement which is demanded by the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. This would both delay the case and result in 
increased costs in litigating the issue. 
Another reason that the DTSA may increase the cost of trade secret litigation is the 
broad scope of discovery permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Discovery in 
trade secret litigation is already very expensive; a recent survey of IP lawyers found that 
median litigation costs through the end of discovery ranged from $250,000 in cases where 
less than $1 million was at stake, to over $1.6 million in cases where over $25 million was at 
risk.21 The stringent pleading requirements and liberal discovery standards of federal courts, 
and electronic discovery, may exacerbate this problem. These cost concerns also call for the 
DTSA’s abandonment. 
4. The DTSA Will Likely Result in Less Uniformity in Trade Secret Law 
Lastly, DTSA’s sponsors contend that its adoption would “[h]armonize U.S. law” and 
“create a uniform standard for trade secret misappropriation.”22 Yet, in reality, the law would 
be adopted against the backdrop of the non-existence of any federal jurisprudence regarding 
a civil trade secret claim.23 Moreover, a careful examination of the bill’s provisions, reveal 
that the DTSA would in fact result in less uniformity in trade secrets law than currently exists. 
                                                 
18 S. 1890, § 2 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(c)). For a fuller discussion of these issues, see 
Sharon K. Sandeen, DTSA: The Litigator's Full-Employment Act, 72 Wash & Lee L. Rev. Online (forthcoming 
2015). 
19 Id. (proposed for codification in 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(1)). 
20 2014 Professors’ Letter, supra note 1, at 3. 
21 Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass’n, Report of the Economic Survey 2015, at 39, I-166, I-169 (2015).  
22 Press Release, Senate, House Leaders Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Bill to Protect Trade Secrets (July 29, 2015), 
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/7/senate-house-leaders-introduce-bipartisan-
bicameral-bill-to-protect-trade-secrets; see also Letter from Association of Global Automakers, Inc. et al., to 
the Honorable Orrin Hatch et al. (July 29, 2015), available at http://www.hatch.senate.gov/ 
public/_cache/files/09ce963b-6166-4156-b924-ab1c7f4098f5/DTSA%20Senate%20Support%20Letter.pdf 
(“The Defend Trade Secrets Act will create a harmonized, uniform standard and system for companies to 
protect their trade secrets.”). 
23 See Sharon K.. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law: Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow 
the UTSA, 33 Hamline L. Rev. 493(2010) (explaining that in the 1960s there were several proposals to adopt a 
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As explained in the 2014 Professors’ Letter, “[t]here is already a robust and uniform 
body of state law governing the protection of trade secrets in the United States.”24 The 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”) has been adopted by 47 of 50 states,25 and many U.S. 
businesses have successfully used the UTSA for decades to combat trade secret 
misappropriation.  Indeed, even advocates of a federal civil cause of action for trade secret 
misappropriation acknowledge that the UTSA helped create a “coherent and consistent body 
of trade secrets law”26 that has resulted in “greater consistency in the application of trade 
secret law and in the laws themselves.”27 As a result, this well-established, substantially 
uniform body of law has a high level of predictability for U.S. businesses and their attorneys.   
The DTSA would undermine this high degree of uniformity by creating new 
differences with existing state law and by requiring the development of a new body of 
federal jurisprudence. For example, the vast majority of states have adopted a three-year 
statute of limitations for aggrieved businesses and individuals to bring trade secret claims.28  
The DTSA has a five-year statute of limitations.29 The DTSA would also accept, without 
change, the existing Economic Espionage Act’s (“EEA”) definition of a trade secret, which 
is broader in several respects than the UTSA.30 Also, as previously mentioned, the DTSA 
appears to endorse a new barrier to mobility of labor by recognizing the so-called inevitable 
                                                                                                                                                             
federal trade secret law but also concerns about the absence of federal jurisprudence on the subject, thereby 
leading to the drafting of the UTSA instead). 
24 2014 Professors’ Letter, supra note 1, at 2; see also TianRui Group Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 
1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]rade secret law varies little from state to state and is generally governed by 
widely recognized authorities such as . . . the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.”). 
25 See Seaman, supra note 3, at 391-92 (detailing each state’s adoption of the UTSA). New York generally 
follows the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, which is largely based upon the UTSA. See Wiener v. Lazard 
Freres & Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 124, 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dep’t 1998) (applying Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition to define a trade secret in New York). Massachusetts trade secret law is based in small part on 
statutory law and in large part on common law that is consistent with what is expressed in the Restatement 
(Third) of Unfair Competition. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, §§ 42 to 42A and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 
266, § 30(4).  North Carolina has adopted a statute that codifies many of the key principles UTSA. See N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 66-152 et seq. (2014). 
26 R. Mark Halligan, Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets:  Critical Amendments to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 
7 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 656, 670 (2008). 
27 David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1091, 1106 
(2012). 
28 Seaman, supra note 3, at 393-94. 
29 S. 1890, § 2 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1836(d)). 
30 Seaman, supra note 3, at 361-62. For discussion of the broad trade secret definition under the EEA, see 
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: Equating Trade Secrecy with National 
Security (on file with authors). 
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disclosure doctrine, even though a number of UTSA jurisdictions have expressly rejected 
this ill-conceived doctrine.31   
Most significantly, the DTSA expressly declines to preempt existing law regarding 
trade secrets because the jurisdictional requirement could not possibly cover all trade secret 
claims.32 This will permit a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation to 
exist in parallel with state law, possibly in the same lawsuit. Thus, in a trade secret dispute, 
the trade secret holder would seek to invoke whichever law—federal or state—appears most 
favorable under the circumstances. This would encourage forum-shopping and cause choice-
of-law problems that are widely recognized as undesirable, and would not advance the fight 
against cyberespionage. This further underscores that the DTSA should be rejected. 
* * * 
For these reasons, the undersigned law professors urge Congress to reject the 
DTSA. In addition, as requested in the 2014 Professors’ Letter,33 we call for your 
Committees to schedule full hearings so that the informed opinions of all sides—both 
proponents and opponents—can be fully discussed and challenged in an open forum.  
Importantly, hearings should not be limited simply to denouncing cyberespionage against 
U.S. companies, which we agree is a problem. Rather, the hearings should focus on the 
costs of the legislation, as well as whether the DTSA addresses the cyberespionage 
problem that it is allegedly designed to combat. In particular, we call for Congress to 
evaluate the DTSA through the lens of employees, small businesses, and startup 
companies that are most likely to be adversely affected by the legislation.  
You may address any reply or correspondence to its authors and organizers, 
Professor Eric Goldman (egoldman@gmail.com), Professor David S. Levine 
(dsl2@princeton.edu), Professor Sharon K. Sandeen (ssandeen@hamline.edu), and 
Professor Christopher B. Seaman (seamanc@wlu.edu). 
 
 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (Ct. App. 2002); LeJeune v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 
849 A.2d 451 (Md. 2004).  For further discussion of labor mobility issues in the technology sector, see 
AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press), 
1994).. 
32 See S. 1890, § 2 (proposed for codification at 18 U.S.C. § 1839(f)) (“Nothing in the amendments made by 
this section shall be construed to . . . preempt any other provision of law.”). 
33 2014 Professors’ Letters, supra note 1, at 7. 
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* All institutions are listed for identification purposes only.  The signatories speak only for themselves, and 
not for or on behalf of their respective institutions or for any other entity. 
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Professors’ Letter in Opposition to the 
 “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (S. 2267) and the 
 “Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014” (H.R. 5233)  
 
August 26, 2014 
 
To the sponsors of the above-referenced legislation and other Members of the United 
States Congress: 
 The undersigned are 31 professors from throughout the United States who teach 
and write extensively about intellectual property law, trade secret law, innovation 
policy and/or information law.1 We urge Congress to reject the proposed legislation to 
create a new private cause of action under the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 
(“EEA”), 2 known as the “Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014” (“DTSA”) and the “Trade 
Secrets Protection Act of 2014” (“TSPA,” collectively, “the Acts”). As explained in 
Senator Coons’ press release announcing the introduction of the DTSA,  
In today’s electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few keystrokes, 
and increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of a foreign government 
or for the benefit of a foreign competitor. These losses put U.S. jobs at risk 
and threaten incentives for continued investment in research and 
development. Current federal criminal law is insufficient.3 
While we acknowledge the need to increase protection both domestically and 
internationally against domestic and foreign cyber-espionage, this is not the way to 
address those concerns. Instead, as explained below, the Acts will create or exacerbate 
many existing legal problems but solve none. Accordingly, we oppose their adoption.    
                                                          
1 Many of the signatories to this letter also have extensive intellectual property litigation experience in 
state and federal courts, including trade secret litigation. 
2 18 U.S.C. § 1830 et seq. (2014). 
3 Press Release, Senators Coons, Hatch introduce bill to combat theft of trade secrets and protect jobs, Office of 








 The Acts should be rejected for five primary reasons:  
1. Effective and uniform state law already exists. 
United States trade secret law was developed and is applied against a backdrop 
of related state laws and legal principles that reflect the values and interests of 
individual states, particularly with respect to issues of employee mobility and free 
competition. There is already a robust and uniform body of state law governing the 
protection of trade secrets in the United States, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(“UTSA”), which has been adopted by 47 of 50 states.4 Built on over 100 years of case 
law, numerous US companies have used it with success to combat trade secret 
misappropriation by both employees and non-employees. Similarly, criminal 
prosecutions under the existing EEA are increasing and are addressing the concerns 
motivating introduction of the Acts.5   
 This deep body of state law creates its own benefits; as the general principles of 
US trade secret law are well-established and substantially uniform, there is a high level 
of predictability by and for US businesses and their attorneys. But because the Acts 
cannot entirely preempt state trade secret law (for reasons that are explained below), 
they will result in confusion, as well as less uniformity and predictability. As a result, 
the business community will suffer from decreased predictability in the law with, as 
discussed below, no corresponding benefits.       
                                                          
4  North Carolina has adopted a statute that is substantially similar to the UTSA. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-
152 et seq. (2014). New York generally follows the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (which is 
largely based upon the UTSA). See Wiener v. Lazard Freres & Co., 241 A.D.2d 114, 124, 672 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 
(1st Dep’t 1998) (applying Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition to define a trade secret in New 
York). Massachusetts trade secret law is based in small part on statutory law and in large part on 
common law that is consistent with what is expressed in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. 
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93, §§ 42 to 42A and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 266, § 30(4). 
5  See Webinar Press Release, Combating Trade Secret Theft: What Every Company Should Know about the EEA 
and CFAA, Ballard Spahr LLP (April 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.ballardspahr.com/eventsnews/events/2014-04-24-combating-trade-secret-theft.aspx (asserting 
that “the U.S. government has made combating corporate and state-sponsored trade secret theft a top 
priority, and both the [Department of Justice] and [Federal Bureau of Investigation] have increased their 
investigations and prosecutions of it.”); see also Indictment, United States v. Wang Dong et al., Crim. No. 14-
118 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2014) (criminally charging five members of China’s People’s Liberation Army with 
economic espionage and computer hacking). 




2. The Acts will damage trade secret law and jurisprudence by weakening 
uniformity while simultaneously creating parallel, redundant and/or damaging 
law. 
Generally, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution6 gives 
Congress power to legislate trade secret law, but Congress’ power is limited.7 To 
address this limitation, the Acts require a convoluted and untested jurisdictional clause 
that currently states that the law would only apply to trade secrets that are “related to a 
product or service used in or intended for use in, interstate or foreign commerce.” 
While the precise meaning of this clause is unclear and unsettled, it obviously does not 
(and cannot) describe all US trade secret information, as not all trade secrets are 
necessarily “related to a product or service … used in … commerce,” like many 
customer lists. Accordingly, the Acts will not supplant state law and we expect that the 
bulk of trade secret claims will still be based upon state law.   
Moreover, even under the Acts, ancillary state law will still apply with respect to 
a number of important issues. Primary among them are ownership of inventions, 
definitions and obligations of confidential relationships, and enforceability of non-
compete agreements. If the concern is preservation of evidence and enforceability of 
judgments, the US already has a rich body of law and procedure that solves most of 
these problems, including the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, multi-district 
litigation procedures, cross-border discovery procedures, and cross-border enforcement 
procedures. Additionally, it is worth noting that the Acts cannot and do not address the 
significant systemic challenges associated with getting jurisdiction over and enforcing 
judgments against foreign entities, infirmities which, standing alone, should cause 
Congress to pause. 
The Acts’ seizure provisions require special attention. The DTSA’s provisions 
that would authorize motions to preserve evidence and seize property are not necessary 
in light of the broad discretion that federal courts already have under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure8 to grant temporary restraining orders ex parte and would arguably 
                                                          
6  U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.   
7 See The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (Congress has limited powers to legislate under the 
Commerce Clause). 
8  See  FRCP 65 (2014). 




interfere with the Rules Enabling Act process.9 Moreover, litigants can already request 
preliminary relief in trade secret cases and there are severe consequences for the 
destruction of evidence under existing law and rules of professional conduct.   
Similarly, the TSPA’s provision, while not as broad as the DTSA’s, acknowledges 
but fails to ameliorate the problems and risks associated with seizure. First, the TSPA 
specifies that such relief is only available upon a showing that the preliminary relief 
that is available under FRCP Rule 65(b) is inadequate, a threshold that we believe will 
be difficult to establish, thereby making the provision superfluous. Second, the required 
showing is nearly identical to the standards that federal courts currently apply when 
deciding whether to grant preliminary relief, but with the odd additional requirement 
that “the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure.” The purpose of this 
requirement and the provision requiring “protection from publicity” is unclear, but we 
are concerned that the TSPA requires a level of secrecy about court rulings that is 
unprecedented. The required procedures and findings are also bound to impose great 
burdens on the federal courts, and like the problems with the jurisdictional clause 
discussed above, arguably put trade secrets at greater risk. Of even greater concern (for 
reasons that are explained below), we are concerned about the anti-competitive effects 
of the seizure remedy.  
Therefore, the Acts will exacerbate rather than solve the perceived problem of a 
lack of uniform state law, with no corresponding benefits and several significant 
drawbacks. 
3. The Acts are imbalanced and could be used for anti-competitive purposes. 
 A hallmark of all US intellectual property laws, including trade secret law, is that 
they include limiting doctrines that are designed to achieve the appropriate balance 
between the protection of intellectual property rights and the preservation of free 
competition. While the Acts appropriately define “improper means” not to include the 
acts of reverse engineering and independent derivation, other limits on the scope of 
trade secret protection are missing. In particular, we note that the Acts do not explicitly 
limit the length of injunctive relief to the period of lead-time advantage, a critical limit 
on potentially interminable injunctions that can prevent fair competition, employee 
mobility and new innovation. Additionally, the seizure provisions of both Acts, but 
                                                          
9 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2014). 




particularly of the DTSA, introduce a new form of preliminary relief that is fraught with 
potential misuse due to the fact that such relief could be granted ex parte, without either 
notice to or an opportunity to be heard by the defendant(s). Both of these failures could 
render the Acts a weapon of anti-competition and societal damage with, again, no 
corresponding benefits. 
4. The Acts increase the risk of accidental disclosure of trade secrets. 
Because of the jurisdictional issue discussed in Point Two, there will likely be 
many motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction that, as a practical 
matter, will require the plaintiff to identify and disclose its trade secrets early in the 
litigation. But under all existing US trade secret law, the understandable common 
plaintiff strategy is to delay the identification and disclosure of trade secrets until the 
latest possible moment due to the heightened disclosure risk that comes from even the 
confidential sharing of information. Thus, if the existence and nature of the alleged 
trade secrets are necessary to establish jurisdiction under the Acts, defendants in trade 
secret cases will be justified in demanding earlier disclosure of the alleged trade secrets. 
This will result in a greater risk of accidental disclosure of the trade secrets and slow 
down the litigation process, with, again, no corresponding benefits. 
5. The Acts have potential ancillary negative impacts on access to information, 
collaboration among businesses and mobility of labor.  
 While the Acts appear to be ineffective and/or unnecessary in combatting actual 
cyber-espionage and other misappropriation, they may have more impact on the 
negative side of the equation, namely, as an additional weapon to prevent public and 
regulatory access to information, collaboration amongst businesses, and mobility of 
labor.  Although not often linked, there is a direct relationship between availability of 
trade secret misappropriation claims and regulatory access to information. Labeling 
information as a trade secret has become a common way to prevent public and even 
regulatory access to important information ranging from the composition of hydraulic 
fracturing fluids to the code inside of voting machines, all of which have compelling 
(but not uncontroversial) reasons for public access in a democracy. These access to 
information issues – which do not necessarily correlate with support for or opposition 
to the subject activities or industries – are exacerbated even by otherwise ineffective 
trade secret law. 




 The threat of a trade secret misappropriation action can and does have a chilling 
effect on collaborative innovation efforts between businesses and can be used by those 
who would rather compete in a courtroom than the marketplace to quell legitimate 
competition. Adding a new remedy that allows companies to seek preliminary relief to 
seize wide swaths of property (including computer networks and servers) would only 
heighten the risk that trade secret litigation will be used as an anti-competitive tool.10 
 Lastly, the importance of employee mobility to the strength and growth of our 
economy cannot be overstated. Reducing mobility of labor impacts not only those 
employees who are directly affected, but their new employers and the families of the 
affected employees. It also has an adverse impact on society by reducing the diffusion 
of skills and knowledge and stifling the innovation that flows from the sharing of ideas 
and information. State law currently protects employee mobility; the Acts do not.   
If Congress is going to further strengthen arguments against access to 
information and simultaneously further limit mobility of labor and potential innovative 
collaboration, as adding yet another potential (even if ineffectual) trade secret 
misappropriation cause of action to the books would do, it should be because the 
benefits of such a cause of action outweigh the costs. Here, as previously discussed, the 
benefits are nonexistent. Therefore, the ancillary costs are not nearly outweighed; in 
fact, the scale leans decidedly to one side.  
 
 In sum, Congress is rightly concerned about cyber-espionage by foreign 
countries and foreign business interests, but adding to well-established domestic trade 
secret law to address such concerns is incomplete, ill-advised, and potentially 
dangerous. The Acts are incomplete solutions because the definition of a trade secret 
                                                          
10 The Acts’ seizure provisions are eerily similar to the problematic provisions in copyright law’s failed 
Stop Online Piracy Act (“SOPA”) and Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft 
of Intellectual Property Act (“PIPA”). SOPA and PIPA were intended to combat online copyright 
infringement, but were never passed in large part because of problematic provisions related to removal of 
allegedly infringing websites from the Internet. See Mark Lemley, David S. Levine and David Post, Don’t 
Break the Internet, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 34 (Dec. 19, 2011) (“Websites can be ‘completely removed from 
circulation’—rendered unreachable by, and invisible to, Internet users in the United States and abroad—
immediately upon application by the government, without any reasonable opportunity for the owner or 
operator of the website in question to be heard or to present evidence on his or her own behalf. This falls 
far short of what the Constitution requires before speech can be eliminated from public circulation”) 
(emphasis in original). 




under US (and international law) is limited and does not protect all of the information 
that may be the subject of cyber-espionage, or even all of the information that many 
businesses believe are trade secrets. The Acts are ill-advised because they focus on trade 
secret misappropriation instead of the bad acts of cyber-espionage and foreign 
espionage – which is where Congress should focus its legislative efforts.11 Finally, the Acts are 
dangerous because the many downsides explained above have no – not one – 
corresponding upside.   
Thus, for all of the above reasons, we oppose the Acts and urge their rejection.  
Additionally, if not withdrawn, we ask Congress to schedule full hearings so that our 
views, and all others, can be fleshed out, challenged and discussed in an open forum. 
The important issues that you are trying to address require and deserve more 
deliberation and input. While we recognize that there have already been some hearings, 
the specific language of the Acts, their effectiveness and their ramifications must be 
discussed and debated in public hearings.     
With regard to this letter, you may address any reply or correspondence to its 
authors and organizers, Professor David S. Levine (dsl2@princeton.edu) and Professor 
Sharon K. Sandeen (ssandeen@hamline.edu). 
Signed,12 
Professor Brook K. Baker 
Northeastern University School of Law 
 
Professor Mario Biagioli 
UC Davis School of Law 
 
Professor Barbara B. Bressler 
DePaul University College of Law 
 
                                                          
11 See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, The Third Party Problem: Assessing the Protection of Information through Tort 
Law, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION OF FACT-BASED WORKS (Robert F. Brauneis, ed., 
2009) (discussing ways to combat bad acts that do not depend on the IP status of the underlying 
information). 
12 All institutions are listed for identification purposes only and the signatories do not speak for or on 
behalf of their respective institutions. 
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